Paweł Fiedor

Pawel Fiedor

My career is driven by a fundamental question: how can we build a more resilient financial system? I've pursued the answer from multiple angles—first from inside the markets, then through deep academic research, and now from within the core of European financial oversight.

It began with a hands-on role at State Street, managing the intricate mechanics of a major US hedge fund. That experience gave me an invaluable, practical understanding of how markets truly operate, a perspective that has grounded my work ever since. To understand the risks hidden within that complexity, I earned a PhD at the Kraków University of Economics, diving into the world of advanced statistical modeling and network theory. This academic journey, recognized in "Advances in Financial Machine Learning," equipped me with the rigorous quantitative framework needed to identify and analyze systemic vulnerabilities.

For me, theory must serve a purpose. I transitioned into public service to apply these insights where they could have the greatest impact. At the Central Bank of Ireland, I was a founding member of the non-bank financial stability division, building its analytical capabilities from the ground up. Now, on secondment to the European Systemic Risk Board, I operate at the intersection of analysis and policy, providing strategic advice and helping to shape EU-level regulation.

My mission is to translate complex data into clear, actionable policy that safeguards our economic future. I am a member of the IEEE, Royal Economic Society, and Polish Economic Society. My LinkedIn profile can be found here and my CV can be found here.

You can reach me via e-mail at [email protected].

References

  • Dr. Mark Cassidy, Director, Central Bank of Ireland
  • Francesco Mazzaferro, Head of the European Systemic Risk Board Secretariat
  • Prof. Dr. Co-Pierre Georg, Director of the Frankfurt School Blockchain Center
  • Prof. Dr. Artur Hołda, Professor at the Kraków University of Economics

Featured Report

As a key contributor, I played a significant role in the development of the ESRB's flagship annual report on systemic risks in the non-bank financial sector: the ESRB Non-bank Financial Intermediation Risk Monitor 2025. This publication provides the core analysis underpinning European financial stability policy in this critical area.

Read the Full Report

Working Papers

  • Information and liquidity linkages in ETFs and underlying markets (with P. Katsoulis)
    We find that exchange-traded funds (ETFs) have differential effects on the underlying equities and corporate debt securities. First, ETFs propagate liquidity shocks to equities but not to debt securities. Second, ETF flows affect the underlying equities' returns to a much higher degree than debt securities' returns. Third, higher ETF ownership increases equities' volatility but decreases debt securities' volatility. The results are consistent with the view that the higher accessibility of equities facilitates the formation of strong information links with ETFs and encourages arbitrage activity, which makes equities' prices sensitive to ETF demand shocks and creates the potential for illiquidity contagion when this link is disrupted. In contrast, the hard-to-access nature of corporate debt securities results in weak information links with ETFs and inhibits arbitrage activity which reduces commonalities between the two markets.
  • Clearinghouse-Five: determinants of voluntary clearing in European derivatives markets
    In the European Union, there is obligation to centrally clear certain credit and interest rate derivative contracts, while other trades can be voluntarily cleared through a central counterparty if the parties to the contract wish to clear it thus. I use a dataset of all newly entered into derivatives contracts in the European Union between March 2016 and June 2017 to show the extent to which central clearing is being used for derivatives belonging to all five major asset classes, and to determine which characteristics of the contracts not under the clearing obligation affect the likelihood they would be centrally cleared on a voluntary basis. I show that currently only around 20% of credit and 40% of interest rate derivatives are centrally cleared, while equity, foreign exchange, and commodity derivatives are barely centrally cleared. I also show that there are significant effects of scale connected with central clearing, both in terms of previous clearing activity of the counterparty and the notional of the specific contract. Finally, I show that various characteristics of the contract, such as the maturity and the type of counterparty involved, also have significant impact on the probability of a trade being centrally cleared, but these effects tend to be ambiguous and depend on the specific combination of factors.

Policy Publications

Interdisciplinary Publications

Links & Resources

Preprints & Citations

Peer Reviews

Code